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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EARL C. FREIS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14184

WHEELER MACHINERY COMPANY,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out
of a collision between the truck-tractor in which the plaintiff was sitting and a caterpillar tractor loaded on a
trailer being pulled by an employee of the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On a verdict of no cause of action by the jury, the
lower court entered judgment of no cause of action in favor
of the defendant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's statement of facts is incomplete and
inaccurate and omits most of the facts favorable to the verdict of the jury.

The facts upon which the jury verdict is

based are as follows:
On January 23, 1973, Rodney K. Bosch, a transport
driver, employed by defendant Wheeler Machinery Company, was
hauling a D-8 Cat from Wyoming to defendant's shop in Salt
Lake City (TR. 41). Defendant's driver was pulling 120,000
pounds on a three-axle, lowboy trailer (TR. 54). Mr. Bosch
was driving at a speed approximately 50 miles per hour as he
approached the accident area (TR. 47). At this point, just
north of the crest of the hill, he saw a patrol car parked
with flashing lights sitting at the side of the road when he
was approximately one-fourth of a mile north of the patrol
car (TR. 48). At this time, he applied the brakes a little
but did not try to stop (TR. 49). He continued on southbound,
driving in the inside lane.
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No flares were out at the patrol car (TR. 29) and
when Mr. Bosch passed the patrol car, no signal to slow or
stop was given to him (TR. 408).
The statements of Mr. Bosch (TR. 361) and Mr. Morton,
the Farmington City Marshal, the driver of the patrol car
stopped north of the crest of the hill, show that plaintiff's
attorney, at the time he arranged to have photos used as exhibits, placed the patrol car about 100 to 150 feet west and
not at the point where it was observed by Mr. Bosch (TR. 117).
Mr. Morton, the Farmington City Marshal, testified to the
effect that where he was stopped, he could not see the earlier
accident at the intersection of U.S. 8 9 and the Farmington
junction and that he did not know that cars had stopped blocking both lanes and backing up the hill behind where Mr. Freis
stopped his tractor and trailers.

Traffic was blocked for

one-fourth of a mile behind Mr. Freis (TR. 83).
About 100 feet south and west of the patrol car,
Mr. Bosch crested the hill and saw the lines of cars stopped
in both southbound lanes ahead blocking each lane on U.S. 8 9
(TR. 47). At this point, Mr. Bosch estimated his speed was
40 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone (TR. 57).
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Mr. Bosch had a heavy load and decided rather than
to try and stop, he would avoid a collision by turning to
his left and going over the island separating the two northbound lanes from the two southbound lanes.

The island was

covered with ice and snow (TR. 31). He never tried to brake
or stop on the dry pavement used by Officer Lord, plaintiff's
expert in making plaintiff's calculations.
Mr. Bosch got the left front wheel of the tractor and
the left wheels of the lowboy over the island and onto the
snow, but the right front wheel caught the edge of the island
and refused to go up on the island or across.

Thereafter, on

the ice and snow, Mr. Bosch, with his tractor and lowboy, rode
the island passing the stopped vehicles on the left.

All

vehicles were passed without contact that were backed up behind plaintiff's tractor and trailers (TR. 51). As Mr. Bosch's
lowboy went past on the left side of plaintiff's double
trailers and tractor cab, a portion of the D-8 Cat sliced
open the aluminum skin of the double trailers and bumped the
cab which plaintiff was sitting in on the left side.
There is no evidence that the plaintiff's tractor cab
was moved in the impact.

Trooper Boelter, the investigating

officer, said he saw no indication that the truck of Mr. Freis
was moved in the impact (TR. 32). Trooper Boelter also said
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that Mr. Freis told him that he was not injured (TR. 33, 302)
and that he saw no indication of any injury on Mr. Freis
(TR. 39).

;

Mr. Freis' testimony showed that at the time of the
accident he had been stopped for about ten minutes with all
air brakes on all axles on both double trailers locked up
with 90 pounds of air (TR. 188, 298).
Although Mr. Freis was a union steward and familiar
with employee rights and working within the scope of his employment, he waited fourteen months, or until after March of
1974, to report to Mr. Millsap, his supervisor for Western
Gillette, that he was injured in this accident (TR. 303).
Although Mr. Freis admitted missing some working days
between the date of the accident, January 23, 1973, and March 1
1974, he never once, prior to March of 1974, claimed he was
injured in the accident to Mr. Millsap (TR. 304).
Mr. Millsap, the supervisor for Western Gillette,
went to the scene of the accident immediately and arrived
before vehicles were moved.
At the scene of the accident, Mr. Millsap, at the
rear of the trailers, had a conversation with plaintiff and
Mr. Dinger, the relief driver, and he was told by Mr. Freis
that he, Freis, was not hurt (TR. 333, 336).
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During the trial, Mr. Millsap was questioned by the
Court as to what was said by Mr. Freis at the accident scene
and after the Court was satisfied as to the witness1 recollection, Mr. Millsap stated:
"I am reasonably certain that Mr. Freis
stated, when I asked him if it didn't shake
him up when the truck hit him and he replied,
f
I didn't feel the thing hit. I just heard a
lot of racket, looked out the window and there
went the mirror1". (TR. 343).
Dr. Thomas D. Noonan, an orthopedic surgeon, did an
independent medical examination on the plaintiff prior to
trial.

Dr. Noonan examined x-rays of plaintiff taken on

March 19, 1974, and November 25, 1974 (TR. 373). On April 2,
197 5, Dr. Noonan took x-rays of the plaintiff (TR. 374) .
Dr. Noonan found that the plaintiff had degenerative
osteoarthritis prior to the accident (TR. 375). He estimated
that this condition had existed for four or five years prior
to the time he saw the plaintiff on April 2, 1975 (TR. 376).
Dr. Noonan stated that without regard to the accident on
January 23, 1973, surgery would have been required by the plai]
tiff to remove the pre-existing bone spurs.

He stated:

"My opinion is that the surgery that was performed would have been required regardless of
whether any intervening event had taken place
including this accident on January 23, 197 3."
(TR. 377, 378).
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proLruaed disc or t'm t he had a cervical strain relating to
the accident.
'\j. hi. doonan, from \ ,jr examination of t..-_
X-rays, your examination of vie patient, the
hospital records, do you have an opinion as to
whether •-" y l ulmi - mar. ha" hrd a protrude?-:; i::i-*';)
i-.. J d-.;..'*. believe he did.
--ou]d have t- look
at the operative notes for specifics.
<^.

i_»o^r, a ^

uiK. u p o r a t l V O

L-:p;'. -:

:h

••

V:e

have got it in evidence.
;,,

Bu( T don't believe he r? i r?..
•)! obriin

i

-^ :

is raster than me.

; .. Th<> oneratinq surgeon does not describe on^.
VO-

HOv, ;

iJU^Jl'J!. ,

ctbSlliill.ig

t.:O.S

i.^ .

I ^ O I J

w-*

the date or? the accident gave a history of not
having been injured that da;., assume further
that his statement: to !•!'r * * illsap who came out
there was: 'I didn't feel it hit at that time,1
assuming that he went fourteen months after the
day of the accident before he ever complained
t. o his employer, won] J yos have sin opinion as
' to whether or not based on that history that he
had a cervical strain arising Cr om the accident
on January 23, 1973?
7-.. Y.-s. T ,/ould.

A. 1 believe to have a cervical strain he
would have fr-lt something, It1 would have been
a w a ^ o s f" '• "*""
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Q. And if he did not he would not have a
cervical strain?
A.

That's correct."

Dr. Gary Larsen said there was nothing he could see,
in March of 1974, when he first examined the plaintiff, that
told him that Mr. Freis was injured in an accident on
January 23, 1973 (TR. 235).
Dr. Larsen stated he had to depend entirely on the
history given by Mr. Freis and as the history was not accurate,
then his diagnosis based on it might not be correct (TR. 235).
Dr. Larsen agreed with Dr. Noonan that the bone spurs
probably pre-existed the accident (TR. 241, 242) .

He also

said the bone spurs that pre-existed could have caused the
numbness in plaintiff's upper extremity (TR. 243). He also
admitted that not giving a history of neck injury until
eight or ten days after the accident was unusual.

He said

that symptoms would usually show up on the day of the accident or two or three days afterward.

He finally admitted he

never saw a protruded disc on x-ray examinations or in the
operation and that the myelogram defect that he did see could
have been caused by a bone spur (TR. 255).
Plaintiff, in Requested Instruction No. 5 (R. 107),
requested that the question of defendant's negligence be
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submitted to tdu: jury and in substance, this request w a s

ARGUMENT
POliV

'i'Hli iSbUh OE bZr'Li^JAI^t ' S E E G E I G E N C E ,
IF AtE, , BEING A PEOXIMATL, CAUSE Of
THE A C C I D E N T WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED
TO THE Jlltv.

hindsight.
Outsicie -*

.. ;, t jiness as:: .:. s i , ; - : a : _

;= -

nut anticipated that traffic w i l l stop or block the m a i n
por ti or of a roadway.
I

E

'

' - e ' ....:

:tows that as he approached

the

patro" -:ai" parkin"! a

the s ido of l. \ .- rend by x*r . M o r t o n , the

ahead was blocked

'hereafter, he ere =3 ted the hi I:., Having

s 1 o w c v i ^ ^ -.; n e o a,. o u t i 0 m 11 e s p e r 1 1 o u 1: , a 1 1 d

Ff

southbound lanes w e r e blocked by vehicles stopped
earlier accident - .

M r . Boscl 1, 2 1 1 the second or u.\

* 11"< ><: I ' } > •:::' f
:or an
a\a _.__aale,

elected rather than to try and stop for tae vehicles b i o c k i no h i : lane and risk h i t t i n g one or m o r e •_•:. I h^ip, to t-nrp.
1

separated
iau •.

-

f I: ai i« I go ov ^r the raised island tiiat

t he northbound two lanes fror. the southbound
• ade tl le 1 a en re , 1 le fo

9

:

• •' '

two
.;,,...

1|!

•

it because once he got the left wheels up on the snow and
ice on the island, he did not have enough traction to pull
the right wheels off the ice and onto the island.

Quickly

thereafter, he found that because of the ice and snow on the
island and the ice at the edge of the island on the north
side and the edge of the inside southbound lane that stopping quickly to the rear of plaintiff's tractor and double
trailers was no longer an option.
There are many exceptions to the Dalley rule.

In

Wright v. Maynard, 120 Utah 504, 235 P.2d 916 (1951), under
Circumstances quite similar to this case, this Court reversed a lower court that directed liability against the
defendant for failing to stop when the defendant had adequate
time to make a judgment and swerve.

In Wright v. Maynard,

supra, at about 6:30 p.m. on January 14, 1949, the defendant
was driving an automobile north on Highway 91 to the City of
Orem.

The road was covered with ice and very slick and

slippery.
to vision.

The night was clear and there were no obstructions
After he rounded a bend, his lights disclosed an

unlighted vehicle protruding into the highway on the side in
which he was traveling with a man in white coveralls standing
next to it. Mr. Maynard immediately applied his brakes but
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due he <: • _i_cw , his car commenced to slide toward tho other
car an^ the man,

'^I'-Jivai't.oj;, :w.- d.;ticwt

• -•-•--•r^.

shouldcj. ol the roadway and -just as ho did G O , tbw
jumped
] sal.-' :

in front o" ni.-..

i:. tin- cr_ :'L, •. :I-:

,!. ) tne
tright

. :

ec i <: 1

.j.fainst M i . Maynard because ho j-jjld nob .-.top i ;-.

tiio range or i\.i t light-;.

This Court- reversed saying;

In the instant case, tiie facts arc different.
Although appellant was not able to stop wittwi
the distance, he could observe substantial
objects in front: of him, sLi.ll he saw them in
time and had sufficient control of his car to
turn aside and avoid running into them had they
remained stationary,
Had respondent herein not
moved from his position nea ' tho door of the
stalled car and jumped to the east as appellant
swerved his car to the east, appellant would
have avoided hitting him. Under such a state
of fact.;.;, t h e p r j no L p 1 e s enunciated in LI u •
Nikoloropoulos and Daliey cases do not appl\.
Even though appellant may have been driving too
fast under existing conditions to stop in time
to avoid hitting substantial objects disclosed
by hi. 5: on ;'l Igh t s had he kepL on a straight
course, still such inability to stop where he
had the ability to avoid a collision with those
objects by some other means, such as turning
aside, presents a different question from thatdecided in the two previous cases above referred
to.
It was a question for the jury to determine whether his inability to stop was the proximate cause of the accident or whether that cause
was tho unexpected change of position by plaintiff.
The court therefore erred in ruling as a matter
of lav; that appellant's negligence was the proximate cause of the respondent's injuries.
Driving

1 tractor pulling

n

~ overload makes stopping

iai more difficult than an ordinal ' vehicle.

If the driver

of a truck, such as Mr. Bosch, drove so slow as to always
be able to stop in any emergency, he certainly would block
a lot of traffic behind.

There is no evidence that the brakes

were bad or that stopping was difficult because of poor
mechanical condition of the defendant's tractor and trailer.
There is no evidence of speed; at the time he saw the stopped,
traffic ahead, he was going approximately 40 miles per hour
in a 65 mile per hour zone.

He had an accident because he

did not anticipate that the ice and snow on the island and
next to the island would make it impossible for him to
safely go over into the oncoming lane.
Negligence should not be predicated upon the wrong
evasive action taken in an emergency.

In Howard v. Ringsby

Truck Lines, 2 U.2d 65, 269 P.2d 295 (1954), a truck driver
was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with an emergency,
a vehicle that came into his lane.

The truck driver for Ringsb;

was loaded with explosives and took two or three seconds to
try and decide what to do and in that time, he lost the point
of being able to stop short of an impact.

The driver might

also have avoided a collision by turning slightly to the right.
Nevertheless, the court sustained a judgment for the defendant
saying that the showing of a mere possibility that an accident
might have been avoided had the defendant pursued different
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•conduct is insufficient to support a finding that the
defendant was negligent.
In the instant case, it is clear that the evidence was
adequate to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff if the
jury had found for the plaintiff.

It is also true that the

location of the patrol car, and the question of what signal,
if any, was given, were in dispute and that the impact with
the plaintiff's tractor occurred not because of the speed and
the distance the defendant driver was from plaintiff's trailers
when the emergency was noted but rather because of the evasive
action he took in turning onto the island.
In Bullock v. Ungricht, ' — U , 2 d — , 538 P. 2d 190 (1975),
the court submitted both the issue of defendant's negligence
and plaintiff's contributory negligence to a jury where the
defendant collided with the rear of the.plaintiff's vehicle
on December 16, 1971.

The jury returned a no cause of action

verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff.

The

evidence showed that the defendant, the following driver, got
no signal that the vehicle ahead was going to stop until the
vehicle ahead was stopping.

The court in affirming a judgment

for the defendant on the submission of the issues to the jury
said:

13

This court has often affirmed the proposition that unless the facts relating to
negligence and contributory negligence are
so free from doubt: that reasonable minds
could not differ thereon a jury question
exists, and if there is doubt about the matter,
it should be resolved in favor of according
the parties the right of trial by jury of those
disputed issues. In harmony of that rule, under
the circumstances as described above, we are not
persuaded to disagree with the judgment of the
trial court that there was a basis in evidence
upon which reasonable minds could find either
way on the issue of defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's contributory negligence and, therefore, properly allowed the jury those issues to
determine.
Since the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, the defendant on this
appeal is entitled to have the Court consider the evidence
and all inferences that may dawn from it in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict.

The jury may have believed

that for the defendant's vehicle to have been going more slowlj
would have been more hazardous to traffic on the highway than
its speed of 4 0 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone and
hence, concluded defendant was not negligent.

The defendant

is not an insurer of the safety of all drivers of vehicles
ahead.
POINT II:

DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS NOT THE
PROXIiMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES
OF WHICH PLAINTIFF COMPLAINED.
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At the time Mr. Freis claimed he was injured, he
was sitting in a vehicle that was anchored to the highway
by 90 pounds of air on five axles of air brakes that were
set.

His vehicle was not moved by the impact.
Plaintiff told everyone at the scene of the accident

he was not hurt.

He told Mr. Millsap that he didn ! t feel it

hit but, "there went the side mirror".
officer that he was not injured.

He told the police

He waited fourteen months

before he told his employer that he claimed he was injured.
His own doctor, Dr. Larsen, said if you have a cervical strain,
the symptoms usually show up the day, or two or three days,
after.

He did not give a history of any symptoms or com-

plaints within that period and first indicated, fourteen
months later, that he had a history of pain eight or ten days
after the accident in the hospital records.

Dr. Thomas D.

Noonan, on examination, found that he had pre-existing osteoarthritis, and that it existed for four or five years prior
to the time he first saw him and prior to the time of the
accident.

He further testified that because he did not have

a history of pain at the time in the cervical neck that it
was his opinion that he did not have a cervical strain and
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said that from his examination of the records, he did not
have a protruded cervical disc.

He related his need for

surgery to the pre-existing condition and said he would have
required surgery because of the pre-existing condition regardless of whether or not there was an accident.

Dr. Larsen,

plaintiff's doctor, admitted that the defect he saw on the
myelogram x-ray could have been a bone spur and conceded he
saw no protruded disc.
The evidence in this case as to whether or not the
plaintiff was injured was very controversial.

In Pauley v.

Zarbock, 29 U.2d 30, 504 P.2d 999 (1970), on a case involving
controversial testimony, this Court said:
The evidence here was controversial. We have
said that negligence, contributory negligence
and proximate cause are jury questions. Believable evidence shows that plaintiff has had
accidents before this case, and one after, where
she suffered injuries requiring some sort of
medication.
Plaintiff recounts parts of the record favorable to her position. We review the case, not
in the light favorable to plaintiff, but to the
conclusion of the jury. Doing so, we agree with
the jury verdict, which, on believable, admissible evidence, fully supports the verdict.
Affirmed with costs to respondent.
In Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 27 U.2d
430, 497, P.2d 236 (1972), Mrs. Patterson, the driver of the
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following vehicle, stated that a child apparently standing
on the front seat of the Pollesche vehicle was not changed
from this position by the force of the impact.

Mr. Pollesche

testified that in two prior accidents he had sustained back
injuries and his testimony showed that he claimed he was
going a little less than 25 miles per hour at the time of
impact.
The testimony of a medical expert regarding Mrs. Pollesc]
showed that in an earlier trial, he testified that on reasonable medical certainty, an earlier accident was responsible
for the lesion and need for surgery that he previously performed.

This made the question as to what injury was received

in the second accident very controversial.

In commenting on

this situation, this Court said:
A large measure of discretion is vested in the
trial court in refusing or granting a motion for
a new trial on the ground that there is an insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment. This court cannot substitute
its discretion for that of the trial court, and
this court will not interfere with such rulings,
unless the abuse of, or failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the trial judge is clearly
shown. If, upon examination of the evidence as
disclosed by the record, it is apparent that there
is a substantial conflict of evidence as to
material issues of fact in the case relative
to which the insufficiency is alleged, this court
must hold as a matter of law that no abuse of discretion is shown.
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In the instant case, there is ample evidence to show
that the jury and the trial court had cause to believe the
plaintiff's injuries and need for surgery was not proximately
caused by the accident on January 23, 1973.
CONCLUSION
As all reasonable men might not draw the same conclusion from the evidence on the issue of negligence, and on
the issue of whether the defendant's negligence, if any,
proximately caused the injuries of which plaintiff complained,
the issues were properly submitted to the jury and the judgmem
of the lower court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of December,
1975.
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

BV

nfl*^'^'%.(&»~j

Raymonft/M. B e r r y

/

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9000
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent by mailing two copies thereof,
postage prepaid, to Mr. Lyle J. Barnes, Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant, 47 North Main, Suite #1, Kaysville, Utah,
84037, this 22nd day of December, 1975.
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